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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
The rulings of the United States board of tax appeals will be found to be
most interesting to the readers of this department of The Journal of Ac
countancy. One of a number of reasons for this is the clarity in which the
matter at issue is set forth and the clarity and conciseness of the decisions.
By the time a claim reaches this tribunal all irrelevancies have been eliminated
through the prosecution of the claim before the several departments of the
bureau of internal revenue, and the issue is joined on one or more questions
of fact or of law.
This month we print a number of decisions briefly stated that it would be
profitable to read in their entirety. Among them special attention is directed
to the following:

“ Directors of a corporation are not the sole judges as to what constitutes
reasonable compensation of its officers.”
From a reading of this decision in its entirety it is apparent that the ruling
will be a precedent in only a limited number of cases, and that it will not
govern generally. It is difficult to conceive of a better authority on the
question of the reasonableness of compensation of officers of a corporation
than the directors, and especially in cases where their acts are ratified by the
stockholders. In view of this fact the foregoing ruling would not hold in a
majority of cases, but the logic of this particular ruling becomes apparent
upon a study of that upon which the board ruled.
Another case that will prove interesting to readers is that in which the
board held that:

“No bad debt deduction may be taken under the 1918 act where the tax
payer held collateral security for the payment of the debt.”
This most obviously logical ruling becomes not so apparently logical when
it is found that the securities held by the taxpayer were bonds of the imperial
government of Russia which had been repudiated by the soviet government of
that country. The board evidently believed it doubtful whether or not the
security in this case was worthless, but it is likely that the board’s ruling
would be quite contrary if it could be shown that the collateral security of the
debt found to be uncollectible was worthless.
A decision referred to in this issue made by the United States district court,
eastern district, New York, is illuminative and of importance. It was held
by this court that carrying charges consisting of interest and taxes on real
estate owned could not be subtracted from selling price of the property to
determine taxable gain or loss. The court apparently took the position that
such expenditures could not be capitalized on real estate held for future sale.
This decision seems to run contrary to a logical arrangement of the facts. If
one purchases vacant land and holds it with the view to realize the apprecia
tion expected upon it, the cost of the property, it would seem, would be not
the original purchase price but that plus what it cost to hold it until it was sold.
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Another court decision of importance is that in which it was held that
compensation of an employee of a municipally owned street railway is not sub
ject to tax. It is not so long ago that a decision was made that the compensa
tion of employees of a municipally owned water system was held to be taxable.
How these two rulings can be reconciled is a nice problem for some court, but
might be considered a bit knotty for an accountant.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RULINGS
The fact that an assessment has been made is not sufficient ground for dis
missal regardless of whether abatement claim has been filed. (B. T. A. deci
sion 123, docket 190.)
This is an instance wherein the commissioner assessed the tax under
section 274 (d) of the act, which provides for assessment in cases where
he believes delay will jeopardize its collection.

A deduction for a bad debt determined to be worthless and written off is
not to be disallowed merely because the creditor thereafter advanced other
moneys to the debtor. (B. T. A. decision 122, docket No. 27.)
The price at which stock was sold to the public was held not to represent
fair market value of the stock where all of the stock offered to the public was
not sold. (B. T. A. decision 162, docket 300.)
Bonuses paid to officers of a corporation prior to, but not voted until after,
the close of the year are deductible. (B. T. A. decision 162, docket 300.)
A lessee of coal lands is entitled to a deduction for exhaustion of leaseholds
based upon March 1,1913, value or for depletion upon the same basis. (B. T. A.
decision 139, docket 233.)
Compensation of an employee of a municipally owned street railway is not
subject to tax. (U. S. district court, E. D. Michigan, S. D. in the case of
Frey v. Woodworth, collector.)
Carrying charges, consisting of interest and taxes paid while holding real
estate, may not be subtracted from selling price of the property to determine
the gain or loss. (U. S. district court, E. D. New York, decision in case of
Westerfield v. Rafferty.)
Directors of a corporation are not the sole judges as to what constitutes
reasonable compensation of its officers. (B. T. A. decision 188, docket 344.)
Accelerated depreciation of special machinery, due to war conditions, was
allowed, but the cost of replacement of such property was required to be
charged against the depreciation reserve to the extent of such accelerated
allowance. (B. T. A. decision 176, docket 452.)
Bank discount neither received nor accrued within the taxable year does
not constitute income for that year.
A bank which includes in income discount neither received nor accrued
within the year should be permitted to change its method of accounting so as
correctly to reflect its income, and proper adjustments should be made in the
returns for prior years. (B. T. A. decision 174, docket 107.)
Taxes assessed prior to but not collected until after the expiration of the
statutes of limitations may be recovered by taxpayer. (U. S. district court,
S. D. New York decision in case of New York and Albany Lighterage Co. v.
Bowers.)
A corporation operating a general insurance agency, 48 per cent of the stock
of which was not owned by the stockholders regularly engaged in the active
conduct of the business, was held not to be a personal service corporation.
(B. T. A. decision 244, docket 1036.)
No bad debt deduction may be taken under 1918 act where the taxpayer
held collateral security for the payment of the debt. (B. T. A. decision 233,
docket 608.)
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TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3671, February 9, 1925)
Bankruptcy—Decision of court
1. Bankruptcy—Interest—Penalty
Under the Federal Revenue Acts, interest at the rate of 1 per centum per
month is not a penalty and under section 57 (j) of the Bankruptcy Act is
collectible from the estate of a bankrupt.
The following decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of United States v. Childs, Trustee in Bankruptcy of J. Menist Co., Inc., is
published for the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.
Supreme Court of the United States
The United States of America, petitioner, v. Edward H. Childs, Trustee in
Bankruptcy of J. Menist Co. Inc.
(November 24, 1924)
Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
The collector of internal revenue of the second district of New York filed
a claim against the trustee in bankruptcy of J. Menist Co., Inc., Edward H.
Childs, in the sum of $2,421.75, plus 5 per cent penalty and 1 per cent inter
est per month thereon until paid. The claim was for an additional income tax
for the year 1917.
The justification for the claim, as stated by the circuit court of appeals, is
as follows: “Act of October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. 300, sec. 212), making section
14-a of the Act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat., 756), applicable to taxes under
the 1917 act. By section 14-a of Title I, part 2, of the act of 1916, it is pro
vided that:
“‘. . . to any sum or sums due and unpaid after the 15th day of June
in any year, or after 105 days from the date on which the return of income
is required to be made by the taxpayer, and after 10 days’ notice and demand
thereof by the collector, there shall be added the sum of 5 per cetunm on the
amount of tax unpaid and interest at the rate of 1 per centum per month upon
said tax from the time the same becomes due.'"
As an element for consideration in connection with section 14-a is section
57-j of the bankruptcy act. It reads as follows:
“ Debts owing to the United States, a state, a county, a district, or a mu
nicipality as a penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount
of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction or proceeding out of
which the penalty or forfeiture arose, with reasonable and actual costs occa
sioned thereby and such interest as may have accrued thereon, according to
law.”
The government withdrew its claim for 5 per cent penalty but urged its
claim for 1 per cent interest.
The referee, however, decided that the cited provisions “constituted a statu
tory characterization or definition, . . . not only as to the 5 per cent penalty
but also in respect to the 1 per cent interest per month, and relieved the estate
in bankruptcy from its payment. He allowed the claim for $2,421.75, with
interest at 6 per cent per annum to the date of payment.
The order was affirmed by the district court. This was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals and its action is now here for review.
At the outset we are confronted with the difference between penalty and in
terest. A penalty is a means of punishment; interest a means of compensation.
Bouvier defines it to be “a consideration paid for the use of money or for
bearance in demanding it when due.” This court has declined to give it
peremptory definition, and construing statutes considered that it could “safely
decline either to limit” the word “debts” to “existing dues, or to extend its
meaning so as to embrace all dues of whatever origin and description.” (Lane
County v. Oregon; 7 Wall., 71, 79, 19 L. Ed., 101.) (See also New Jersey v.
Anderson, 203 U. S. 483, 493, 27 S. Ct., 137, 51 L. Ed., 284.) To what con
clusion does like liberty of construction conduct in the present case?
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The imposition of a tax is certainly a function of government and creates
an obligation, and the power that creates the obligation can assign the measure
of its delinquency—the detriment of delay in payment—and section 14-a has
done so in this case, and explicitly done so. Five per centum penalty is the
cost of delinquency, and interest upon the amount due at 1 per cent per
month—12 per cent a year. There is no ambiguity in the declaration nor the
distinction made. Against their clearness and completeness section 57-j of
the bankruptcy act is cited.
The government yields as to the 5 per cent penalty. It resists as to the
1 per cent interest. The circuit court of appeals considered that the 1 per
cent was involved, as well as being in effect penalty and not saved by its
name, though it was imposed by the legislature and within the legislative
power, and notwithstanding that taxes are treated as debts within the meaning
of the bankruptcy act. (In re Sherwoods, 210 F., 754, 758, 127 C. C. A., 304,
Ann. Cas. 1916A, 940; Kaw Boiler Works v. Schull, 230 F., 587, 144 C. C. A.,
641, L. R. A. 1916E, 628.)
The circuit court of appeals adjudged the tax in the present case a debt and
assigned against it interest at 6 per cent, the court considering that that in
terest was compensation for the delinquency, anything in excess becoming
penalty and within the prohibition of section 57-j. The court said:
“On the point at bar (1 per cent interest as the price of the delay being
penalty) we are in accord with In re Ashland, etc. (D. C.) (229 F., 829), and
hold that, there being no evidence of any injury or damage to the government
by the withholding of this tax, except that which flows from the nonpayment
of a just debt, anything in excess of the legal rate of interest is to be treated
as a penalty and not allowed.”
We are unable to concur. It makes the rate of interest that of a particular
locality, differing with the locality—in New York, as said by the government,
6 per cent; in the Middle West, 8 per cent; and on the Pacific coast, 10 per
cent—and abridges or controls a federal statute by a local law or custom,
and takes from it uniformity of operation. Besides, the federal statute is
precise, and it is made peremptory by the distinction between “penalty” and
“interest,” and if it may be conceded that the use of the latter word would
not save it from condemnation if it were in effect the former, it can not be
conceded that 1 per cent per month—12 per cent a year—gives it that illegal
effect, certainly not against legislative declaration that is within the legisla
tive power, there being no ambiguity to resolve.
To this conclusion, New York v. Jersawit (263 U. S., 493, 44 S. Ct., 167,
68 L. Ed.—) is not antagonistic. There a statute of New York (Consol.
Laws, ch. 60) was passed on which required “every domestic corporation” to
“annually pay in advance ... an annual franchise tax” upon its net
income for the year next preceding, and provided that, if the tax be not paid,
the corporation should pay “in addition to the amount of such tax . . .
10 per centum of such amount, plus 1 per centum for each month the tax
. . . remains unpaid.” This liability the state courts pronounced a penalty
and not to be allowed. In that conclusion this court concurred and decided
that, being penalty, it was disallowed by bankruptcy act, section 57-j. And
this not only because the 1 per centum was “more than the value of the use
of the money,” but because it was added by the statute to the 10 per cent to
make a single sum, and “must be treated as part of one corpus, and must
fall with that.”
The tax in this case is one on income; a burden imposed for the support of
the government. Interest is put upon it and so denominated, distinguished
from the 5 per cent as penalty, clearly intended to compensate the delay in
payment of the tax—the detriment of its nonpayment, to be continued during
the time of its nonpayment—compensation, not punishment.
Judgment reversed.
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(T. D. 3661, January 5, 1925)
Income taxes — Revenue act of 1924—Decision of Court
1. Returns—Publicity—Constitutionality
Section 257 of the Revenue Act of 1924 is constitutional and under its
provisions income-tax returns constitute public records to the extent of the
name, address, and amount of income tax paid by a taxpayer.
2. Same—Injunction
Injunction will not lie to restrain the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
from publishing, pursuant to section 257 of the Revenue Act of 1924, the name,
address, and amount of income tax paid by a taxpayer for the year 1923.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
in the case of Gorham Hubbard v. David H. Blair, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others
concerned.
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Equity No. 43277
Gorham Hubbard, plaintiff, v. David H. Blair, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, defendant
(December 3, 1924)
MEMORANDUM

Hoehling, J. : Plaintiff, a resident of Boston, Mass., alleges that on March
10, 1924, he filed in that collection district a federal income-tax return for
the calendar year 1923, and that he paid the several installments of tax
thereunder from time to time as the same became due; that defendant is
threatening to publish the figures of the tax so paid by making the same
available to public inspection in the office of the collector of internal revenue
at Boston and elsewhere; this under the provisions of section 257, paragraphs
(a) and (b), of the act of congress approved June 2, 1924; and plaintiff states
that such publication, if made, will be in derogation of his rights, as well as
detrimental and offensive to him; and, further, that the provisions of the
act of 1924, supra, are unconstitutional and void in that congress has no
right to invade the rights of privacy of citizens; and that said provisions
violate the fourth amendment; and, accordingly, he prays that defendant be
enjoined from publishing figures of the tax paid by him by making the same
available to public inspection.
Defendant moves to dismiss the bill upon the grounds: (a) Want of equity;
(b) that no property right of plaintiff is involved; and (c) that said section
257, paragraph (b), is within the constitutional power of Congress.
The case has been argued upon the motion to dismiss, and submitted for
determination as upon final hearing.
The question thus presented is of exceeding importance both to the govern
ment and to the vast body of taxpayers of the United States.
In order to view the legislation so challenged by plaintiff in its true relation
to income tax or revenue legislation enacted by congress, it may be helpful to
consider briefly and in chronological order the development of the subject.
The first income tax law was that of August 5, 1861 (12 Stat., 294), which
imposed a tax of twenty millions of dollars, apportioned, and to be levied
wholly on real estate; and it also levied taxes on incomes whether derived
from property or profession, trade or vocation. Apparently, the only reference
therein as to publicity is found in section 49 thereof (being the section which
imposed the income tax), in these words: “and the said taxes, when so assessed
and made public, shall become a lien on the property or other sources of said
income for the amount of the same, ” etc. [Italics supplied.]
Next followed the act of July 1, 1862 (id., 473), which repealed the above
section 49 (and certain other sections), and enacted other sections in lieu
thereof; but, in the new or substitute sections the above words, “and made
public,’’ do not appear; nor was the same or similar designation again used
in the succeeding legislation of that period, so far as the court has ascertained
from reading the acts. (See acts of March 3, 1863, id., 718; June 30, 1864,
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13 id., 281; March 3, 1865, id., 479; March 10, 1866, 14 id., 4; July 13, 1866, id.,
137; March 2, 1867, id., 477; and finally, July 14, 1870, 16 id., 256.)
The above legislation grew out of the civil war and the system of taxation
therein provided ceased to be operative with the end of the year 1871.
As a matter of history, the court understands that income-tax lists were
printed and published during at least parts of the period while said legisla
tion was operative; and, further, that the publication thereof, then as now,
provoked controversy both for and against. Whether the matter proceeded
further than public discussion, the court is not advised; nor has it found any
decided case concerning the matter, if any such case there be.
In passing, it may be noted that section 38 of the above act of June 30, 1864,
contains the following provision:
“Provided, That if any such officer shall divulge to any party, or make
known in any manner other than is provided in this act, the operation, style
of work, or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer visited by him in the
discharge of his official duties, he shall be subject to the penalties prescribed
in section thirty-five (thirty-six) of this act.”
The mistake of writing the word “thirty-five," instead of thirty-six, was cor
rected by amendment in the subsequent act of March 3, 1865, supra.
The above provision later became original section 3167, R. S. U. S. (to be
further noticed below); although, as will be seen from its language, it had
reference (before its amendment in more recent years) to “the operations,
style of work, or apparatus of any manufacturer or producer,” visited by an
internal-revenue officer in the discharge of his official duties; and then had no
relation whatever to an income-tax return.
Thus the matter stood during the years and without change or amendment
until the enactment of the federal income-tax law (later held unconstitutional
(Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S., 601) ) of August 15, 1894
(28 Stat., 509, 557) which latter reenacted the provisions of said section 3167,
R. S. U. S., but it added thereto an express prohibition against disclosure of—
“the amount or source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particu
lars thereof, set forth or disclosed in any income return, by any person or cor
poration, or to permit any income return or copy thereof or any book con
taining any abstract or particulars thereof, to be seen or examined by any
person except as provided by law,” etc.

And the act made it further unlawful for—
“any person to print or publish, in any manner whatever not provided by
law, any income-tax return or any part thereof or the amount or source of
income, profits, losses, or expenditures appearing in any income-tax return,” etc.

The violation of any of the above provisions was made to be a misdemeanor,
punishable in like manner as provided in said original section 3167, R. S. U. S.,
Next in order of time and importance in tracing the history of revenue
legislation in so far as it relates to the matter of publicity, is the corporation
tax law of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat., 11), the sixth subdivision of section 38
of which act provided that, when the assessment shall have been made as
therein provided, “the returns, together, with any corrections thereof which
may have been made by the commissioner, shall be filed in the office of the
commissioner of internal revenue, and shall constitute public records, and be
open to inspection as such." [Italics supplied.]
An amendment to that provision was made by the act of June 17, 1910
(id., 494), as follows:
“Provided, That any and all such returns shall be open to inspection only
upon order of the president, under rules and regulations to be prescribed
by the secretary of the treasury and approved by the president.”
(Note.—The above provisions of the corporation tax law will be further con
sidered later on herein.)
Later on came the federal income-tax law of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat.,
114, 177), wherein said section 3167 is reenacted in the same language in
which it had been set forth in the act of August 15, 1894, supra; and, there
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fore, it need not here be repeated. Furthermore, the same section 3167 as so
amended was carried forward and in the same language in the several suc
ceeding revenue acts of September 8, 1916 (39 id., 756, 773); February 24,
1919 (40 id., 1057); November 3, 1921 (42 id., 268); and, finally, in the present
act of June 2, 1924.
From the foregoing summary of legislation concerning said section 3167 it
will be observed that disclosure, examination, inspection, printing, or the
publishing of any income return, or any part thereof, “except as provided by
law,” is prohibited, and made to be a misdemeanor and punishable as such.
The question then arises whether, and, if so, to what extent, disclosure of
such income return has been "provided by law.”
As to this it may be remarked that, save only as the first income-tax law
of August 5, 1861, supra, provided that the tax, when assessed "and made
public,” shall become a lien on the property or other source of the income;
as well as the provision as to publicity contained in the corporation tax law
and its amendment above referred to; the right of property or right to privacy
(whichever it may be) of the taxpayer in respect of the income-tax return
filed by him, if legal right it be, was respected in the income-tax legislation
enacted by congress, until the act of February 24, 1919, supra, and which act
thus provided:
“Sec. 257. That returns upon which the tax has been determined by the
commissioner shall constitute public records; but they shall be open to in
spection only upon order of the president and under rules and regulations
prescribed by the secretary and approved by the president: provided, that
the proper officers of any state imposing an income tax may, upon the request
of the governor thereof, have access to the returns of any corporation, or to an
abstract thereof showing the name and income of the corporation, at such
times and in such manner as the secretary may prescribe: provided further,
that all bona fide stockholders of record owning 1 per centum or more of the
outstanding stock of any corporation shall, upon making request of the com
missioner, be allowed to examine the annual income returns of such corpora
tion and of its subsidiaries. Any stockholder who pursuant to the provisions
of this section is allowed to examine the return of any corporation, and who
makes known in any manner whatever not provided by law the amount or
source of income, profits, losses, expenditures, or any particular thereof, set
forth or disclosed in any such return, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year or both.
“The commissioner shall as soon as practicable in each year cause to be
prepared and made available to public inspection in such manner as he may
determine, in the office of the collector in each internal-revenue district and
in such other places as he may determine, lists containing the names and the
post-office addresses of all individuals making income-tax returns in such dis
trict.”
Next came the revenue act of November 23, 1921, supra, which reenacted
said section 257 without change.
Finally, the present revenue act of June 2, 1924, supra, was enacted, which
materially amended, as well as enlarged the scope of, the section named, in
that the above two paragraphs were made to be (a) and (b), respectively,
and in (a) there was inserted an additional provision authorizing certain
committees of congress to obtain and use information concerning income-tax
returns and in (b) by adding a provision to permit public inspection as to the
amount of the income tax paid, so that that subparagraph of the section as so
amended now reads:
“(b) The commissioner shall as soon as practicable in each year cause to
be prepared and made available to public inspection in such manner as he
may determine, in the office of the collector in each internal-revenue district
and in such other places as he may determine, lists containing the name and
the post-office address of each person making an income-tax return in such
district, together with the amount of the income tax paid by such person.” [Italics
supplied.]
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It will thus be observed that the public inspection theretofore authorized, of
name and post-office address of the taxpayer merely (acts of 1918 and 1921),
has been enlarged and extended (by the present act of 1924) to include, as
well, the amount of the income tax paid by each such person. And it is that
provision which has given rise to this controversy and suit.
If the question thus presented were an open one, in the sense that it had
not theretofore been the subject of judicial decision, and even if the court in
that event entertained some doubt as to the validity, or otherwise, of such
legislation, nevertheless, due respect for a coordinate branch of the govern
ment would require that it should only be decided that congress has tran
scended its powers when it is so plain that the duty can not be avoided. (Sink
ing Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700, 718; Trade Mark Cases, 100 id., 82, 96; Naganab
v. Hitchcock, 25 App. D. C., 200.)
But is the question really an open one? The answer, in the opinion of the
court, is found in the decision by the supreme court of the United States in
the case of Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U. S., 107, 176-177), which case
involved the constitutionality of the corporation tax law of 1909 as amended
by the act of 1910 (supra) hereinabove referred to. In that case the validity
of the legislation mentioned was attacked on various grounds and, among
others, upon the ground that the provision for inspection of the returns filed by
corporations was violative of the fourth amendment.
In rejecting that objection the opinion of the court thus stated:
“The contention is that the above section as originally framed and as now
amended could have no legitimate connection with the collection of the tax,
and in substance amounts to no more than an unlawful attempt to exhibit
the private affairs of corporations to public or private inspection, without any
substantial connection with or legitimate purpose to be subserved in the col
lection of the tax under the act now under consideration. But we can not
agree to this contention. The taxation being, as we have held, within the
legitimate powers of congress, it is for that body to determine what means
are appropriate and adapted to the purpose of making the law effectual. In
this connection the often quoted declaration of Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat., 316, 421) is appropriate: ‘Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, and which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are
not prohibited, but are consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.’
“Congress may have deemed the public inspection of such returns a means
of more properly securing the fullness and accuracy thereof. In many of the
States laws are to be found making tax returns public documents, and open
to inspection.
“We can not say that this feature of the law does violence to the constitu
tional protection of the fourth amendment, and, this is equally true of the
fifth amendment, protecting persons against compulsory self-incriminating
testimony.’’
While it is true, the above decision concerned the corporation tax law, and
counsel for plaintiff here insist that the personal rights of individuals were not
involved therein, except indirectly, nevertheless the language used by the court
in its opinion is certainly broad enough to include the legislation the validity
of which is involved in the instant case, and, in the opinion of this court, the
decision of the supreme court in that case is controlling here.
Having thus concluded that paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 257 of the
revenue act of 1924 are valid and enforceable, it results that income-tax re
turns, when the tax thereunder has been determined, constitute public records;
and that, to the extent of the name of the taxpayer, his post-office address, and
the amount of the income tax paid by him, it is made to be the duty of the
commissioner of internal revenue to make the same available to public inspec
tion.
But at this point arises the further interesting as well as important question
as to the limitation imposed by the same law upon the right to use information
acquired as a result of the authorized “public inspection,” since, as above
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shown, a subsequent section of the same revenue act makes it unlawful “for
any person to print or publish in any manner whatever not provided by law
any income return, or any part thereof," etc., under penalty of fine or imprison
ment, or both—the violation thereof being made to be a misdemeanor.
The question just suggested, however, is not here necessarily involved; and
should it come to pass that the provisions of said section 3167, as amended, be
upheld as valid and enforceable, and that plaintiff’s name, post-office address,
and amount of income tax paid be printed or published by any person, doubtless
he will be entitled to appropriate redress in that behalf.
The motion to dismiss is granted; and, in the event plaintiff shall elect to
stand upon his bill of complaint, final decree of dismissal thereof may be
prepared and submitted on notice.
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